‘It’s not just the economy, stupid’. The multi-directional security effects of the private sector in post-conflict reconstruction by Martin, Mary & Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Vesna
  
Mary Martin and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic 
‘It’s not just the economy, stupid’. The 
multi-directional security effects of the 
private sector in post-conflict 
reconstruction 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 Original citation: Martin, Mary and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Vesna. (2017)  
‘It’s not just the economy, stupid’. The multi-directional security effects of the private sector in 
post-conflict reconstruction. Conflict, Security and Development, 17 (3) ISSN 1467-8802 
DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2017.1324663 
 
© 2017 Taylor & Francis 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/75195/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: Month Year 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
  
2 
 
 
 
‘It’s not just the economy, stupid’. The multi-directional security effects of 
the private sector in post- conflict reconstruction 
 
Mary Martin and Vesna Bojicic- Dzelilovic 
 
3 
 
  
  
ABSTRACT 
 
Using human security lens, this article explores the interface between transnational 
corporations (TNCs) and post-conflict, post-crisis societies. It demonstrates how TNCs  
influence political and economic transition, through impacting the everyday experience of 
security , creating multiple and ambiguous effects on individuals and communities. Examples 
of two foreign corporate engagements: carmaker Fiat’s investment in Serbia and steelmaker 
ArcelorMittal’s takeover in Zenica in Bosnia-Herzegovina are used to illustrate the density of  
relationships between global companies, host governments, civil society and local 
communities whose effects extend beyond economics to broader aspects of the conflict space, 
and  have a bearing on the transition and reconstruction agenda.  Our findings question the 
quality of development and industrialisation policies championed by post-conflict 
reconstruction approaches, and challenge the assumption that economic growth and 
investment by foreign companies in particular, will necessarily deliver peaceful transition. 
The article contributes to the scholarly debate about the connection between security and 
development, and to policy discussions about appropriate means for reviving economies 
within externally led peacebuilding and conflict prevention initiatives. 
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Introduction  
Security at the level of the everyday has increasingly occupied academic and policy discourse 
over the past two decades. Propositions such as the security-development nexus, community 
or citizen security, resilience, and the concept of human security invite us to consider forms 
of insecurity encountered by individuals and groups, how to increase the ability of conflict 
and crisis-affected societies themselves to protect against disruptive economic and political 
shocks, and to reframe  external security and development assistance  to take account  of the 
complexity of  grass-roots experiences. 
1
  
Business intersects with this everyday understanding of security and with the 
resilience of individuals and communities in many ways. As employers and resource actors, 
companies are a source of material security for workers and local communities, and both 
providers as well as users of public goods. They create and are embedded in dense networks 
of social relationships and material practices, involving states, civil society actors, 
international agencies and individuals. In post-crisis environments, their presence creates 
heightened expectations and fears among local populations since their impact as a single 
actor is proportionately greater than in stable societies. Global businesses in particular deploy 
considerable   leverage over other actors, creating productive sites of wealth generation, but 
also tension between the international market and the local context.  
This article explores the multidimensional interface between the private sector and 
transition societies affected by war and crisis to show how global companies as a discrete 
category of the global private sector  interact with the everyday  experience of security in 
these contexts, creating multiple and ambiguous effects on individuals and  communities.   
Using a  human security lens to investigate this interaction, we  capture the consequences  of 
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corporate agency,  reframing it as doing more than engendering economic outcomes and 
processes, in order  to overcome binary accounts
2
 that prevail in the dominant discourse  
portraying the role of the private sector in post-conflict reconstruction as either 
predominantly positive or negative. 
The entry point for our analysis is the transnational corporation (TNC), as a discrete 
category of  actor within the political, economic, social and cultural environment of post-
conflict.
3
  While we recognise that TNCs are not all the same, or will act in ways which 
necessarily can be generalised, we are interested in how TNCs enter into the dynamics of 
transition, navigating between  the demands of distant stakeholders and  an ecology of states 
and societies reshaped by the experience of war; and how this manoeuvring influences grass 
roots security and with what implications for the transition itself. 
4
  
Empirically, we draw on two examples of global business investment in transition 
societies with recent experience of armed conflict to illustrate the complexity of TNC 
engagement. Rather than using the example of resource rich, low income countries in conflict 
which provides the setting for the majority of private sector impact studies in peacebuilding  
scholarship, 
5
 we examine two  cases in  middle-income countries, Fiat in Serbia and 
ArcelorMittal in Bosnia- Herzegovina. Through selecting cases of different industrial sectors 
in the Western Balkans
6
 we hope to enlarge the availability of contextual data on foreign 
corporate interventions, and while not offering a comparative analysis of the two cases, 
identify common  patterns of  hitherto low visibility effects of foreign investment on human 
security. The case studies are  based on a total of  27 individual interviews and respondents in 
focus groups, some of which have been repeated, with company workers, management, trade 
unions, representatives of local community, civil society and policy makers in Serbia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina conducted between 2010-2015.   
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Our findings demonstrate the diverse, often paradoxical, indirect and invisible 
outcomes TNCs engender within host countries, for individuals, communities and policy 
elites. They question a view of foreign companies as ‘neutral’ transmission channels for the 
supposed beneficial effects of economic reform, and provide evidence that corporate 
encounters with conflict societies are more complex than simply fuelling conflict, insecurity 
and human rights abuses.  We hope to contribute to the wider scholarly debate about the 
connection between development and security, to arguments about the quality of post-conflict 
growth in terms of equity, social justice and sustainability  of employment and livelihood 
opportunities,  and the importance of emotional and psychological factors behind economic 
and political transformations. We also hope to  inform policy discussions about appropriate 
tools of  externally led post-conflict reconstruction  and conflict prevention initiatives.
7
    
 
The first part of the article examines the two dominant paradigms for analysing 
corporate behaviour and impact in post-conflict reconstructions and underlines their 
shortcomings. In the next step, a human security approach is developed as a complement to 
the existing explanations on the links between security, development and the role of global 
business, and as a framework for analysis. The second part  provides a brief overview of the 
transition context in the Western Balkans, as the setting for our empirical investigation.  The 
section  after presents the two cases studies, showing processes of change unleashed as a 
result of corporate  intervention, and how these affect experiences and perceptions of 
security, and individual vulnerability in the host communities and wider local society. The 
penultimate section  summarises these findings and in conclusion we reflect on the dynamics 
they reveal about the private sector in transition environments, and the implications of a 
human security view of corporate behaviour for existing approaches towards business 
management and public policy in the post-conflict space.  
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Corporate actors through a human security lens 
Business operations are significant in post-conflict and post-crisis  recovery because they 
contribute to economic activity and regrowth,  and are potential conduits for sustainable 
development, community resilience  and conflict prevention.
8
 At the same time, recovery 
entails a reworking of social dynamics and local capacities;
9
 thus it is likely to produce 
tensions through marginalising parts of the population or exacerbating inequalities, and 
disrupting settled practices and institutions on which individuals have come to rely. In post-
conflict, post-crisis contexts, such dilemmas are accompanied by a recognition that the 
beneficial effects of growth, industrialisation and investment cannot always be assumed.
10
  
Two paradigms- one dominating the mainstream liberal peacebuilding discourse and 
the other formulated within a discourse on human rights and governance- inform  the agenda 
of external intervention/assistance to peace and state building which promote economic 
liberalisation and market forces.
11
 The first  provides a permissive space for foreign 
investment to expand in transition environments, and privileges the economic aspects of 
corporate presence in post-conflict, post-crisis  recovery and reconstruction, treating 
companies as neutral or passive vectors for economic change. Such a reductionist view  risks 
that  the business contribution to transformation becomes over-generalised. Ganson and 
Wennemann note that, the liberal peace turn in policy practice pursued by international 
financial institutions in particular, has fetishized markets and national level liberal economic 
institutions, and ignored  the influence of  corporate interventions on  economic, political and 
societal transformation at the local level.
12
  The attention paid to global business within the 
policies and politics of post-conflict transition thus reifies its role as an economic/financial 
agent. Moreover, it frames business as itself deserving  protection against locally 
dysfunctional regimes- for example through a strong emphasis on anticorruption and FDI-
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friendly legislation. Such an approach  perpetuates a classic model of corporations as wealth 
maximisers, internalises the benefits of foreign investment and tacitly accepts a relationship 
of dependency by government and civil society on foreign companies, even while it 
challenges other forms of dependency, for example on external aid.
13
 Importantly, the 
approach of introducing classic development mechanisms into conflict-affected settings 
overlooks the significance of distinctive operational and political  relationships between 
companies, governments and civil society on the ground.
14
   
While TNCs are  portrayed as transmission mechanisms for economic reform and 
growth, or ‘least-worst’ forms of delivering public good, in the absence of functional state 
administration,
15
  they do not exist in a vacuum.
16
 They operate within a complex landscape 
of local society, as context-specific sites of social interaction where behaviour and norms are 
produced and where forms of authority over people, property and functions are created. 
A critical stream within security studies, as well as a global governance agenda on 
business and human rights, is more explicit about corporate agency, focusing on predatory 
behaviour, and the capacity of companies to ‘do harm’. Here we also find accounts which 
attempt to explore a more positive role for corporations connecting corporate responsibility to 
contributions to peacebuilding and conflict prevention, both mitigating and enhancing 
business behaviour and norms.
17
 This stream also acknowledges that perverse collusion by 
foreign companies with local structures is part of the predation problem, which produces 
unintended consequences in terms of development objectives, and influences  social welfare 
in conflict affected societies.
18
 
Rather than treating  corporate contributions to development transformations  either as 
a ‘black box’, with taken- for- granted consequences, or viewing foreign investment in terms 
of its capacity to abuse human rights and frustrate justice, studying TNC impacts through a 
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human security lens offers a granular approach  seeking new vantage points from which to 
view the security-development interface and allowing for a more detailed analysis of what 
happens where foreign investment and fragile communities meet. The aim is to identify how 
business operations impact  stress factors and the dynamics which exist at grass roots in 
conflict societies, zooming in on personal  vulnerability and uncertainty. 
Human security has been put forward as an alternative to traditional state-based 
understandings and practices of security, which frames security threats in terms of everyday 
issues of material welfare, physical safety and psychological wellbeing.
19
 Unlike classic state 
security with its primary focus on the  defence of territorial integrity, the guarding of  
sovereign power and maintenance of order, human security asserts individuals (also groups 
and communities of individuals) as the prime referent object to be made safe.
20
 While  
motivated by a normative ambition to protect and empower individuals, it also serves an 
analytical goal of capturing a context specific perspective, which promises a counter-weight 
to top-down, elite explanations of social, economic and political action.  A human security 
approach foregrounds lived experiences, and highlights the exposure of individuals to 
multiple and interconnected  forms of insecurity, so called ‘entangled vulnerabilities’, both 
chronic and immediate. 
21
 In the conflict and post-conflict space human security draws 
attention to personal experience and individual agency at moments of crisis and dislocation.  
It evaluates the severity and scope of downside risks and how these might be mitigated.
22
    
It is an approach based not just on understanding the nature and level of threats, but on 
reifying individual agency as meaningful, even in settings where it could be supposed that 
people’s ability to act and influence their own circumstances and social outcomes might be 
minimal.
23
 The individual in human security is not an isolated being, but socially situated or 
‘attached’, her essence and individuality arising through social relationships.24 Thus, human 
security seeks to  take into account objective , subjective and intersubjective understandings 
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of security and examine how individuals and groups of individuals react to challenges to their 
material, physical and emotional safety in their totality. It applies a relational perspective to 
analyse the sources of both vulnerability and response. It seeks to identify and understand not 
only the direct and intentional effects of actions (including policy) but also those effects 
which arise inadvertently and indirectly, through the interactions of multiple 
actor/stakeholders. 
25
  
Conceptual thinking on the link between human security and the role of the private 
sector in conflict and post-conflict is of relatively recent vintage and is yet to incorporate 
important insights from a business-centric literature which examines corporate behaviour and  
the  interpenetration between business and society.
26
 Management studies and ethnographic 
and socio-political investigations of corporations, which look at the personality of 
corporations and how business instrumentalises different types of power and resources, take 
as their focal point business relations and the interpenetration between governments and 
communities.
27
 For example, the ‘state of exception’ thesis captures the way host 
governments and foreign companies interact, with the latter deploying relative power 
advantages in terms of material resources and potential for economic development, to 
establish its own rules, norms and parallel structures within the jurisdictional authority of the 
nation state.
28
 The proposition is that TNCs are able to  create sovereign spaces which benefit 
from preferential  rules of taxation, administration and worker  rights, and which create new 
forms of inclusion with  extraordinary political and economic advantages. Companies are 
able to wage  bargains with workers and with public authorities within these spaces, offering 
material benefits, but at the cost of  increased  pressure to perform,  and uncertain tenures of 
employment. What we can draw from this analysis is that foreign companies use their 
advantages ( financial and knowledge resources)  to accrue further gains, which may be at the 
expense of individuals, and that they do so within a transactional relationship with 
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government, and to a certain extent other non-state, local actors.  It is this relational aspect of 
TNC behaviour, particularly in contexts where the government as the key local partner is 
rendered weak, dysfunctional by conflict, and often lacking development capacity and will 
for constructive engagement, which is absent from macroeconomic analyses and deserves to 
be explored in terms of how it affects the predicaments of individuals in the workplace and 
the community.  
Drawing on these insights, we argue that a human security framework is  able to say 
more about the scope and nature of business impacts in conflict settings through its explicit 
focus on individual experiences and manifestations of vulnerability, by highlighting the  
context of interactions between  corporate behaviour, personal insecurity and individual 
agency,
29
 and by privileging interconnectedness – of both threats and actors rather than a  
search for causal links between TNCs and economic outcomes. 
The context: triple transition in the Western Balkans 
A long process of unravelling of former Yugoslavia in the 1980s took place in the context of 
severe economic crisis. Liberal economic reforms to resolve the crisis failed and opened a 
path to populist politics around ethnic identity, which contributed to a collapse of multi-
ethnic socialist Yugoslavia as a single country.
30
The seven new successor states have for 
most of the last 25 years, at different pace and with differential success, been grappling with 
the challenges posed by a triple transition- from armed conflicts, regime change and state 
formation. Each of those transitions on its own is a monumental task for any society; their 
conflation in the Western Balkans made the associated process of social change more 
intricate and disruptive, leading to successive cycles of political and economic crisis.
31
 A 
triple transition entailed a profound social transformation
32
 whereby social structures, actors, 
rules and norms regulating those societies were redefined. Central to this process was the 
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reconstruction of social identities and in particular the creation of ‘aggressive ethnic 
identities’, which caused massive physical and social dislocation of large groups of people, 
and shaped the economic, political, institutional and governance context of these societies.
33
  
Power structures that emerged through a conflation of armed conflicts and political 
and economic liberalisation underwritten by identity politics have given shape to divisive 
political and economic systems, characterised by weak rule of law, and exclusionary 
structures of opportunities, including along clientelist and kinship lines. In the context of war-
induced economic stagnation and material deprivation, social entitlements and constitutive 
rights were overhauled, which pushed many individuals, households and communities into a 
precarious position in terms of life chances and everyday survival, and heightened existential 
uncertainty.
34
  This type of governance by self-seeking elites - focused foremost on resource 
distribution rather than mobilisation of developmental resources for the public good- has 
compounded the process of erosion in social relationships. Across the Western Balkans a 
form of ‘differentiated citizenship’ has emerged whereby despite formal equality, some 
groups experience different forms of discrimination, and denial of basic social and citizenship 
rights.
35
  The socio-economic situation varies across ethnic-groups, which alongside 
widespread corruption and nepotism which operate as another axis
36
 of division and 
discriminatory practice-both between and within different groups-, has contributed to an 
erosion of trust both in institutions and at inter-personal level, and the culture of distrustful 
politics.
37
  
Stagnant economies, which took years to recover to pre-war output levels, contributed 
to rising inequalities and social polarization. Poverty has increased and its profile changed,  
as a class of ‘new poor’ are drawn from a former middle class- which coupled with the rise of 
new wealth often through illegal and criminal means- is a distinctive mark of triple transition 
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in which economics, identity politics and violence combine in socially disruptive ways and 
create persistent uncertainty for ordinary people.
38
 
At the personal level, the impacts of institutional and societal transformations are 
manifested in approaches to policy making, for example in  how foreign investment is 
perceived and encouraged in post-conflict reconstruction. ‘Selective paternalism’ which 
stems from a lack of separation between public and private governance is manifested in 
discretionary exercises of power, poor property rights protection and lack of state 
accountability for its actions.
39
 Privatisation, a flagship economic transition policy reform
40
  
designed to  provide the initial boost to foreign direct investment,  turned into a controversial 
policy in the light of growing evidence of mismanagement through collusion between 
political and economic elites across countries and industries, notably manufacturing 
concentrated in large communist-era conglomerates.
41
 In the eyes of the general public and 
the workers of the companies involved, it was an unjust, corruption-prone process that 
benefited narrow elites at the expense of workers’ rights, and public interest. Such 
perceptions negatively affected corporate governance, the scope for enterprise restructuring, 
employer-employee relationships as well as the trust in public institutions
42
  necessary to 
support developmental transformation in the Western Balkans.  Labour was also weakened 
by privatisation
43
 which pitted workers against new managements.  Weak civil society as a 
legacy of the socialist era compounded the problem of weak state capacity and willingness to 
conduct reform processes in a socially ameliorative and economically effective manner.
44
 
Former Yugoslavia’s  unique legacy of a workers’ self-management system was important 
not only in shaping negative attitudes towards local governments’ capacity to manage 
economic reforms competently, transparently and responsibly, but also in contributing to 
heightened expectations as well as fear towards foreign investors. In such a context, TNCs  
were able to operate with fewer restrictions in pursuing their interests and to exercise greater 
14 
 
leverage in setting the terms of inward investments. At the same time, overcoming the 
constraints posed by a triple transition required  TNCs in the Western Balkans to navigate a 
terrain of disruptive social relations underpinned by a struggle for the access to resources and 
limited  economic opportunities, in a politically fragile context. 
Case studies: Fiat in Serbia and ArcelorMittal in Bosnia- Herzegovina 
This section investigates empirically the impact of TNCs presence through examining how 
corporate behaviour shapes individual and community experience and perceptions of 
security, and the  interactions between business, workers, citizens and government elites   as a 
result of the establishment  of two foreign production plants, in the aftermath of regional 
conflict.   
Fiat  
On 23 December 2009, Italian car group Fiat completed a deal to take a 67 per cent majority 
stake in  a new joint company Fiat Automobiles Serbia (FAS), created out of  Serbia’s oldest 
and largest industrial conglomerate Zastava, based in the regional city of Kragujevac.  Fiat 
agreed to invest €700million in the company and develop it as a world class manufacturing 
and export base for its model 500 car. By 2016,  FAS had become the biggest exporter in 
Serbia selling €663million of cars  in the first half  of the year 45 in line with expectations of a 
positive economic role for TNCs. 
The Zastava plant was a rusting and polluted industrial site, which had been bombed 
during the NATO campaign of 1999. Fiat refurbished the plant and committed to employ an 
initial 3000 out of a workforce which before the war  had reached 20,000 people, and 
undertook to produce 200,000 cars a year. The initial impact of securing employment for part 
of the original workforce  has been tainted   by substantial fluctuations in job numbers, due to 
the cyclical nature of the international car market.  Since 2013 there have also been repeated 
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production halts, pay cuts and in 2016 Fiat announced a change in the terms of its agreement 
with the government, under which it would lay off  of a third of the workforce. The company 
justified it decision as  necessary to cope with a 16 per cent fall in demand, illustrating the 
tension between global performance targets and local priorities. While such practice is 
normal for  a commercial  private enterprise, it contrasts with  the experience of  pre- 2009 
Zastava as a typical  socialist state conglomerate. From a vast, sprawling site which 
dominates not only the city of Kragujevac, 138 kilometres south east of Belgrade, but also 
industry in the surrounding region, the factory was the cornerstone of  a social system of 
employment, housing, education and welfare. It started to disintegrate during the wars of the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, and was impacted further by UN sanctions. After the fall of  
Milošević in 2000, Zastava rebuilt production partly through assembling Fiat models or by 
using foreign technology to develop new versions of its Yugo model. In May 2008, when the  
government opened negotiations with foreign carmakers about the purchase of a majority 
stake in the company,  Fiat was selected largely because of a history of collaboration with 
Zastava over the preceding decades. The deal with the Italians was made public just one week 
before elections in June 2008, which were won overwhelmingly by  a liberal coalition headed 
by Boris Tadić, on the promise of a pro-European future for Serbia. The importance of the 
company for the local economy  and electoral fortunes of the Tadić government is 
acknowledged by Fiat.
46
 The new company became a project of ‘national interest’.47 
Fiat’s human resources and management policies however represented a rupture with 
former Yugoslav self-management practices. Under the deal, Fiat retained one in five Zastava 
employees from the original workforce. Those kept on were mostly aged between 30 and 40, 
and were sent to Turin in Italy for retraining. After the 2008 global financial crisis Fiat scaled 
down jobs and introduced short-term employment contracts delivering a major socio-cultural, 
as well as economic jolt to the city. As part of the retrenchment Fiat also cut its support to 
16 
 
local sports facilities, which had previously exemplified its commitment to the civic life.
48
To 
assuage detractors, the g 
Workers believe  that rather than Fiat delivering a European future, Serbia remains 
marginal  within  Europe’s market economy. Compared to  European production centres  
wage levels are a third lower than Poland and a fifth lower than  Italy.
49
The much anticipated 
500L model, produced at the plant contains little local content and is unaffordable for most 
local people. 
50
 Nonetheless, the Kragujevac plant is an example of  a corporate vision 
representing the transformational impact of a global company. It is an island of technological 
excellence, separated physically and metaphorically from the rest of the city and the region. 
Tight security on the entrance gates which deters chance visitors and controls within the plant 
are a visible sign of how the company regulates  this inner world. The company has 
introduced its own norms and practices which limit interpenetration of the plant by the 
city/region. Fiat has restricted aspects of integration into the local community in favour of 
creating new practices and institutions which are more closely aligned with its own 
objectives. Underpinning its changes is the sense  that it does not want to be ‘contaminated’ 
by local contacts.
51
  
 Employment at Fiat favours younger workers – the average age is just 31- which 
accentuates age discrimination in an economy with few employment opportunities for older 
workers. Apart from age, other qualities differentiate between those included in the Fiat’s 
workforce and those left out. Status is accorded to being a certain kind of person – young, 
healthy, active (both socially and physically) and well-dressed. For the first few years of the 
joint venture, Italians and Poles dominated  management positions,  and were regarded  as 
norm setters in changing the working culture of the plant (Poland is the location of the other 
major Fiat production plant in Eastern Europe), which adds to the inferiority feeling among 
the local management. In 2015 Italians accounted for between 30-40 per cent of management 
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positions, a ratio which caused shopfloor workers to complain that they have limited 
opportunities for advancement. Allegations  that personal connections and friendships with 
people in senior positions are needed for promotion further illustrate the tense relationship 
that has developed between the new management and employees who draw on different 
registers of corporate behaviour. In Zastava, 90 per cent of top management appointments 
used to be political. Workers believe that an insider system for promotion still prevails, but 
personal interests have replaced political connections , and human resource (HR) strategies 
are still subject  to certain forms of corruption, based on knowing someone in the Italian 
hierarchy.
52
  
 HR policies include providing facilities for  young  families of workers. FAS has built 
a  playground, created scholarships for workers’ children and holds open days where 
employees are encouraged to bring their families onto certain areas of the site to enjoy the 
facilities. In some cases, such as in the provision of kindergarten places, this social provision 
fills a gap in public goods provided by the municipality. Fiat shapes education in Kragujevac, 
partly  by providing facilities for employees’ children within the plant, partly by influencing 
city schools, for  example, encouraging the introduction of Italian and robotics courses. The 
local high school in Kragujevac responded by reorganising its curriculum to match company 
requirements, reflecting the expectation of the compnay’s long terms presence in the city.   
For the company, education is  not just a target for philanthropic interest but a key 
means of  creating the type of workers it needs for the plant of the future. Similarly, safety 
training is not only an important part of worker relations inside the plant but is a way in 
which Fiat engages with citizens outside.  Fiat staff conduct classes on safety procedures in 
local schools.  Healthcare is outsourced to a private provider from Belgrade for cost-
effectiveness in preference to using local facilities, creating a further division between those 
inside the plant and those outside who rely on a public service which remains underdeveloped  
18 
 
Fiat has also reshaped everyday life in Kragujevac by  changing social relations  
through the shift in employment demographics. One former worker explained it as: ‘An old 
guy loses his job as an accountant in the plant, but he then opens a bar which his son, now 
hired by Fiat, can go and drink in’.53 Job cuts also fuel a belief among citizens that some 
groups are privileged over others to keep their positions. This points to the difficulties that 
minorities such as Roma and disabled, once given guaranteed access to workplaces in the 
plant, face in finding jobs with Fiat. 
54
  
Fiat has also redrawn the relationship between business and government.  Although 
Fiat’s intervention ended state ownership of Zastava, close links with the government remain. 
The government plays an active role in constructing FAS as an exceptional entity.  When Fiat 
revised  production targets, the government paid Fiat €10,000 per job to create 1400 new 
posts at the plant. Such practices cast a new light on   FAS’s reputation  as a flagship for 
Serbia’s transition to a modern liberal economy, and its ability to attract foreign investment 
has to be seen in terms of  the government’s eagerness to demonstrate economic benefits 
from the deal.  At the same time, the government has found its decision-making powers both 
enhanced and circumscribed by the presence of Fiat. Despite not being a member of the EU –
Serbia has been invited to join the European Union Automotive Committee –which sets 
competition, production and environmental standards for car makers, thus improving its 
access to international economic and political forums. At the same time, Fiat  and other 
foreign investors  have unprecedented leverage over government  decision-making through 
the embassy network, the increasing power of employment associations controlled by 
companies, to negotiate wages and a system of ‘White Books’ which hold government 
ministries accountable to the foreign private sector.  
The effects of Fiat’s investment in Zastava are evident in various ways. The 
fluctuation in employment prospects, the introduction of new skills and welfare provision 
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represent direct and visible consequences of Fiat’s engagement.  Yet these consequences 
have been felt differently at the level of individuals compared with the national level. At the 
national level  there have been economic and political benefits. The company is seen as the  
poster child of Serbia’s transition, it has produced record export earnings and afforded the 
country an improved ‘European’ status from hosting a major international manufacturing 
plant. At the level of individual workers, the impacts have been mixed, bringing jobs and 
benefits to those with continuing employment, but aggravating uncertainty across the wider 
community and disrupting relationships at every level from the personal to the political. 
Workers and citizens have reacted to the uncertainty associated with exposure to the global 
market place by highlighting increased social tensions and pervasive feelings of mistrust in 
place of the solidarity ethic which had previously underpinned relations between the car 
plant, the city and the country, and which had been strained by the recent experience of war.  
 
ArcelorMittal  
ArcelorMittal Zenica (AMZ)
55
 became a member of the world’s largest multinational steel 
company ArcelorMittal on 14 August 2004 through the sale of shares owned by the Bosnia- 
Herzegovina Federation
56
  government. The value of the privatisation deal was reported at 
$280million, which included a commitment to invest $200million.
57
 At the time, this was the 
single largest FDI in Bosnia- Herzegovina. Before the break up of former Yugoslavia, BH 
Steel under the name Željezara Zenica, was the largest steel maker in the country. Locally in 
Zenica, a city located some 60 miles North of the Bosnia- Herzegovina capital Sarajevo, ‘the 
company was the city’. Together with its ancillary activities, the company employed some 
22,500 people, and  supported development of other industries in the central Bosnia region. It 
was a principal investor  in physical and social infrastructure, including local university 
which hosted a regionally renown metallurgy research institute.   
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The  Zenica region has been one of the economically more depressed parts of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina since the 1992-1995 war, with one of the highest unemployment rates in the 
country .
58
 In this context, the arrival of ArcelorMittal, a global leader in the steel industry, 
provided a lifeline for Zenica’s regional economy. By 2014, 10 years after ArcelorMittal took 
over BH Steel, and despite turbulence caused by the global economic downturn in 2008/9, 
AMZ was Bosnia- Herzegovina’s second largest exporter. Moreover,  it increased its share of 
the Balkan steel market from around eight  per cent to 46 per cent.
59
  
The sale of BH Steel to ArcelorMittal followed a five year struggle  under the joint 
ownership
60
 of the Bosnia- Herzegovina Federation government and the Kuwaiti consulting 
and investment company to restart production after the 1992-1995 war. The inability of the 
Bosnia- Herzegovina Federation government to turn around the relationship with the Kuwaiti 
investor and begin the process of company rehabilitation, left the destiny of the company in 
the hands of the management. It took  them three years to find an investor to fund the 
implementation of a recovery and restructuring plan whose centrepiece was an investment in 
restarting  integrated production, 
61
 which provided doubling the capacity to 2.2 million tons 
of steel and required 4,500- 5,000 workers.
62
  BH Steel management’s vision was to turn, in 
partnership with industry leader ArcelorMittal, the former ailing steel maker into a cutting 
edge manufacturer, by utilising existing knowledge, experience and tradition.
63
  
A very few  details from the privatisation contract are publicly available other than on 
the technical aspects and the total workforce, which is a source of lingering suspicion among 
the company employees and citizens of Zenica.  Some of the key aspects of the privatisation 
agreement concerning the production capacity and employment have not been met.  Although 
integrated production started in 2008, the total output of around 700,000 tons is below the 
pre- war level and significantly below the installed capacity. This has resulted in significant 
job losses from around 4,800 employees on the register at the time the contract was signed, to 
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2,650 in October 2014. Since the onset of the global economic crisis in 2008, a policy of 
balancing job losses and sporadic hiring of younger workforce has been supplanted by a ban 
on new full time employment, combined with a policy of new recruitment on fixed-term 
contract basis. In contrast, the core workforce regularly receives salaries higher than the 
country average, which illustrates the divisive  impact of the company’s presence which 
benefits only a small minority of  labour force in an impoverished city. Another aspect of 
ArcelorMittal’s operations which has put the company on a difficult path in interactions with 
the local community, local authorities and civil society organisation concerns its 
environmental record. Environmental standards have improved compared to pre-war levels, 
but high air pollution in Zenica remains  an issue through which different local parties asses 
the company’s commitment, credibility and its standing as a world-class TNC.   
   The Federation government, although a minority stake owner, has taken a marginal 
interest in the new company,
64
 and avoided to engage in difficult restructuring issues of 
surplus workforce, working conditions, and investment in environmental protection. In 
contrast, the company is at the heart of local politics because of its significance for the revival 
of local and regional economy. The company’s employment and environmental practices, and 
its position as the main provider of town’s heating are key political battlegrounds. These 
issues have been a main cause of frustration for the local residents over  the company’s 
presence in the city. There is a widespread view  that the  government has taken a back foot 
in pressing the company to find solutions for frequent break downs in the heating system and   
high pollution levels. The control of the heating provision strengthens the company’s 
leverage in negotiations with the local authorities over the implementation of its investment 
and business agendas. To overcome various constraints salient to Bosnia- Herzegovina 
fragmented and ineffective governance system, and political instability,  AMZ has also over 
time become more proactive in liaising with both the Federation and Zenica municipal 
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government which has increased the density of the company’s relations with a variety of 
actors at the local, regional and national level beyond its narrow economic scope. 
AMZ approach to company restructuring through  cost reduction,
65
 while delaying 
investments in technological upgrading and maintenance, has caused disappointment, and a 
sense of unfulfilled expectations and suspicions of AMZ widely shared by the local 
population. The company justifies its approach on account of alleged difficult operating 
environment in Bosnia- Herzegovina, lower efficiency compared to other ArcelorMittal’s 
plants, and by turbulence in the world steel market caused by the availability of cheap 
Chinese steel. As valid as those claims may be,  AMZ  approach is consistent with 
ArcelorMittal’s  corporate vision as a company that strives to ‘achieve the lowest cost steel 
production in each of its markets’.66 Taking advantage of a low domestic cost base is a key 
element in ArcelorMittal business strategy; around a quarter of its total output is produced in 
plants that are among the lowest cost producers in the world.
67
 This low cost production focus 
is evident in  AMZ business practices- from employment issues, health and safety, to 
investment in equipment and its maintenance, and  in environmental protection.  
ArcelorMittal’s takeover resulted in substantial job losses in an economy already 
burdened by  high unemployment level caused by war time destruction and disruption in 
productive capacity. Although the company agreed to maintain the workforce at 2,860 
workers under pressure from trade unions, the actual number fluctuates depending on 
company sales, which creates precarious employment for part of the company’s workforce. 
The redundancy policy has  discriminated against  older, unskilled workers and those living 
outside Zenica
68
 who were usually the first ones to be fired. The overhaul of employment 
structure  had an uneven effect on employment status and pay.  Different wage is paid for the 
same type of work across the work shifts, which has financial implication for the respective 
groups as well as their relationships. Another aspect of change which disturbed within group 
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solidarity and caused workers’ frustration concerned a new management structure  whereby 
frontmen were promoted into managers. In workers’ view, a lack of clarity about the 
responsibility of this new management layer for accidents has made it possible to avoid 
sanctions for their faults at the expense of workers’ safety. The company’s human resource 
strategy has involved gradual replacement of local senior cadre with staff from other 
ArcelorMittal companies which the workers view as yet another way of exercising control. 
Appointing a foreigner as a head of human resources is seen as a tactical move to facilitate 
the implementation of the company’s  redundancy program.69 
The employment structure overhaul also affected  the occupational safety. To 
maximise the use of labour, in some cases four posts were replaced by one person and the 
workforce was retrained to multitask so that it can be deployed according to production needs 
and market demand.
70
 The changes in health and safety standards have amplified the impact 
of such  practice that privileged efficiency over employment safety.  
A lack of interest by higher government levels, which extracted themselves from the 
relationships between the company, its labour force, and local community, has strengthened 
AMZ’s position in negotiating with local constituencies. The company has been able to 
dampen various demands from employees and the local community regarding job 
entitlements, environmental protection and infrastructure investment seen at odds with its 
status as a private, commercial entity.
71
 AMZ take over has brought about a major 
transformation in the power relations between the AMZ management and trade unions. 
Relations between the company and civil society, mainly environmental organisations are 
strained, and at times openly confrontational. Although improved, pollution levels in Zenica 
far exceed other ArcelorMittal sites in Belgium, the Czech Republic and Romania, which 
speaks to a disproportionate power AMZ enjoys in relations to its interlocutors in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. 
72
 Complicated and poorly enforced laws and regulations, have enabled the 
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company  to run its operations in Zenica much more flexibly as suggested by the ‘states of 
exception’ thesis.73  Caught between a tacit (and tactical)  government neglect and the 
company’s priorities, local villages fringing the plant site which are directly exposed to 
pollution have set up local community councils to engage with the company to address the 
harmful environmental effects of the company’s operations .74 These practices are new to 
local communities accustomed to a different role the company had under socialist self- 
management. For both the workers and the local communities, the process of learning new 
roles and recasting their relations with the company is aggravated by a lack of information 
and transparency regarding company’s practices and its strategy.  Uncertainty over the 
company’s long term commitment to Zenica, which is the uppermost concern among the 
locals, rekindles a feeling of uneasy coexistence in the context of the city’s new dependence 
on the company, despite contributions it has made to local development and post-conflict 
transition.  
 
Discussion of findings 
Using a human security lens, the cases of two global investors in the Western Balkans were 
seen to shape  individual encounters with in/security, and exacerbate a  broad range of 
vulnerabilities, whether in terms of economic welfare, civic rights, personal dignity, cultural 
norms and community relationships. In both cases these individual vulnerabilities map onto- 
in terms of  reflecting or aggravating- gaps in governance and social tensions which are part 
of the conflict legacy. 
The findings confirmed   the ‘state of exception’  hypothesis , that foreign investors 
represent a distinction from social life outside the manufacturing plant, but also from historic 
patterns of behaviour. In Serbia and Bosnia,  TNCs have established  private  rules and 
25 
 
practices, which  are acknowledged, tacitly or explicitly by government authorities and civil 
society. In some cases they  contradict  the formal undertakings contained in official 
contracts, which  are not available publicly, allowing companies  to assert their own 
interpretations of the agreements.  
Within this sphere of exception, TNC practices are disconnected from the frameworks 
within which domestic business operates, and which are familiar to local people. Thus the 
intervention of foreign investment constitutes a double rupture: a break with the past, as well 
as   modes  of behaviour, rules and commercial practices, which are deliberately   distanced 
from prevailing  business norms and economic governance including  mainstream transitional 
reforms. TNC exceptionalism implies a new mode of belonging and association,  based on 
marketable skills rather than membership of a traditional national or local community
75
 in a 
context of societies reshaped by the experience of war, including emergence of new societal 
cleavages. Such  processes are exclusive, marginalising those who remain outside of the 
physical or metaphorical sovereign space created by the company.  In the case of Fiat in 
Serbia and ArcelorMittal Zenica, older workers , those who hail from rural communities, 
disabled people and minorities, feel themselves designated as not welcome.  Recruitment and 
human resource practices undermine social solidarity and  community relations by pitting one 
group of citizens against another, and underwrite new divisions within local society.  
However the case studies showed that TNCs affect individual security in 
simultaneously positive and negative ways.  TNCs have improved  individual security and 
wellbeing, through providing jobs, social facilities such as education and community 
resources, and in the case of Bosnia even local heating, at the same time as creating feelings 
of insecurity among workers, and disempowerment among those excluded from the labour 
force. What makes the experience of Bosnian and Serb workers different compared to 
individuals in settled societies, and relevant in a context of post-conflict transition is that the 
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TNCs are able to  influence basic elements of everyday life engendering an overwhelming 
sense of financial, managerial and normative power, and fear through  dependency on 
elements which are beyond individuals’ control. Those uncertainties are perceived as more 
existential given the fragility of the social context post-war, and the absence of a 
counterpower in a form of a developmental and welfare- providing state. Asymmetric  power 
relations between the company and local society and   the inability of governing authorities to 
exercise meaningful controls over the TNCs– compounded by the agendas of the local 
political elites concerned with consolidation of power-  exacerbated  personal vulnerability 
across a range of issues encompassing  material welfare and dignity.   
Our cases showed that TNCs impact on human security in the two countries was 
ambiguous, paradoxical and unclear, because it was also shaped by  how individuals 
responded to global corporate behaviour, relativizing their situations, making compromises 
and accepting trade-offs, lowering their own thresholds and standards of security because of a 
lack of opportunities for employment and productive activity in a post-conflict transition 
environment. For example, it  is seen as better to have a job than challenge corporate practice, 
or better not to complain about pollution for fear that the company will abandon the  plant 
altogether, or that workers whose families are involved in protests over the pollution could 
lose jobs. 
 
Conclusion  
In this paper we explored the role of the global private sector in post-conflict transition from 
a proposition that conventional accounts do not fully capture how corporate interventions 
shape transitions to peace and stability, and how companies engage with the conflict context 
at local level. By positioning our inquiry in terms of human security and investigating how 
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TNCs impact everyday experiences of insecurity, we have attempted to make an argument for 
‘unbundling’ foreign investment to gain a better understanding of what TNC operations mean 
for individual and community security, beyond national policy or a contribution to macro-
economic growth.  
   This alternative view means that TNCs should not be seen as merely transmitting 
economic change, or taken for granted as neutral conduits for development, or alternatively 
as conflict-instigating actors. Rather we have sought to reveal them as actors capable of 
influencing security in multiple ways which encompass every dimension - social, cultural, 
psychological and economic- necessary for the safe and fulfilled life as a foundation of 
sustainable peace. More than autonomous actors, our case studies showed how foreign 
companies are complex sites of interaction between the global economy and the local ecology 
of post-conflict; between the power of foreign resources on the one hand, and fragile state 
institutions and civil society and vulnerable  individuals on the other; and within these 
interactions, how affective factors such as trust, self-reliance and expectations are significant.   
    In the post-conflict context, corporate behaviour shapes an environment characterised 
by  severe material needs, governance gaps and social tensions. It was striking  in the case of 
Fiat how the company initially failed to respond to the conflict legacy treating its investment 
in Serbia as simply another low income country development project, thereby missing the 
wider political and civic implications of its presence. The combination of corporate 
intervention and post-conflict means that foreign investment cannot be seen as ‘business as 
usual’ in transition settings, rather it is loaded with additional implications for how societies 
come together and regenerate to build sustainable peace. We have expanded on the ‘state of 
exception’ thesis of business behaviour to show how the relative power advantages deployed 
by TNCs  and the creation of exceptional spaces and bespoke practices in fragile countries 
can aggravate existing levels of insecurity but also provide individuals with preferential 
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benefits over and above public services and civic life beyond the manufacturing/production 
site. 
    We believe there is value in detailed empirical examinations of TNC engagements in 
order to highlight the disjuncture between corporate strategies and public policy on one hand, 
both of which privilege the economic dimension of intervention, and on the other, the wider 
impacts of foreign investment, beyond economics, which are also salient in terms of 
transition. Although we argue the need to explore the context specifics of each case of foreign 
investment, as a granular approach to analysing the role of the private sector, general patterns 
emerge across  case studies. These include  the exaggerated dependency created among 
individuals and communities, the feeling that individuals are trapped between the imperatives 
of a global market place and the weakness of their own governments and civil society 
representatives shaped by the particular local experience of conflict, and the mismatch 
between different constituencies’ expectations of foreign investment as a factor in post-
conflict reconstruction.  
   There are limitations in generalising from the two cases presented here: in Serbia and 
Bosnia the TNCs were relative newcomers rather than implicated in the conflict itself as is 
the case in other conflict- affected countries. They were invited as part of a wider 
statebuilding/peacebuilding agenda, positioned as ‘rescuing’ collapsed economies. At the 
same time, they encountered a particular history of self-management and worker solidarity 
within former socialist conglomerates. This both helped and hindered the integration between 
the company and the community, sharpening the relational dynamics and increasing 
expectations, which in turn led to feelings of broken promises and disappointed hopes from 
transition.  
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   Employment precariousness, a  transfer of employment  between generations and 
uncertainty about the long-term commitment of international companies  to local production 
sites, create a  spectrum of personal threats to security which could be replicated in many 
transition settings. Specific to our two cases was that individual insecurity increased as a 
result of  ‘legitimate practices’ such as privatisation and foreign investment inflows, which 
were not only regarded as standard economic policies but which were framed as  necessary 
and indeed key processes of modernisation and the introduction of a liberal market economy 
to aid post-war transition. Here the picture is of individual welfare subordinated to an 
overriding interest in creating state-of- the- art industrial infrastructure:  a plant capable of 
producing world class exports of Italian cars, or high tonnage steel made to the latest 
technological standards. This modernisation logic created  a space conducive to forms of 
unwitting abuse such as the cultivation  of employment anxiety as a tool for controlling both 
workers and local politicians,  and a lack of accountability  by corporations towards local 
populations, reinforcing dynamics of distrustful politics.   
   The enormity of transition has been greatly underestimated in the Balkans, and our 
cases present evidence of how corporate engagements play out in the face of a triple 
disruption to economy, governance and stable order. They show how local actors, states and 
civil society have failed to adjust to private sector led development while all stakeholders 
struggle to manage the complex effects of global business presence in the midst of such far-
reaching dislocations.  The lessons for post-war development include a need to alert policy 
makers, corporate strategists and target populations alike to the extensive nature of corporate 
impacts against this backdrop, not least to realise the full potential of the global private sector  
as an effective agent of peace and development. 
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